Over the years as telephone switches evolved, setting up calls between parties changed from -

A switchboard operator at the telephone company central office plugging in, and pulling out  jacks between the parties...

To cumbersome mechanical devices that performed many of the same tasks...

To the modern electronic switches which, without an outward sign of motion, do the same job as its forebears... only a lot faster and a lot better.  

Let's take a little closer look at these modern electronic switches that do all these wonderful things.

OK, we already established that although we see no sign of motion, these modern electronic switches perform the same switching functions as did the mechanical device and the human it replaced. We can't see two lines being connected as we might have 50 years ago, but we know that the two lines do indeed get connected.  

We would all answer somewhat differently depending upon our knowledge of computer science, but when we got down to basics we would have to agree that computers, and instructions to those computers deserve the credit for this feat.

But when we talk about all these other high tech contraptions aren't we talking about things that are controlled by computer circuits and software? Just because it is not sold at Comp USA, does not mean that it is not at least part computer! There are countless everyday examples of these types of gadgets -- your VCR, your car, your video camera, your cell phone and your copy machine, all use computer type circuitry and they all receive instructions -- some from you, and some built in.

Now lets get back the modern electronic switch that handles our phone calls. I took this long detour because some people seem to have a terrible time accepting the fact that this modern electronic switch is nothing more than a special purpose computer. As a computer, it has certain qualities.

It follows instructions given to it by software that is installed by the manufacturer or modified locally..

If the software permits it,  it can follow the instructions of  an outside source, such as a tone on a keypad depressed 3000 miles away.

It operates by stealth. That is, it does its job of say, connecting two phone lines without moving any wires, or looking to the naked eye, any different before, during, or after completion of the phone call. Certainly, the phone company keeps a record of the fact you made a long distance phone call and spoke for 45 minutes -- trust them to do that. Of course there might even be a little red light on a circuit board that comes on when the two lines are connected, but, as a practical matter,  the computerized electronic switch is a machine that operates by stealth.   

Once in a while it needs maintenance. We'll have more to say about that in a few minutes.

Now enter the innovators. These are the guys who come up with things like Caller ID, Call Blocking, Caller ID Blocking, Call Forwarding, Three Way Calling, etc. etc. And as you would expect, with some programming instructions, the modern, computerized  electronic telephone switch is assigned to handle these chores.

Many years ago, I learned that to be a good investigator, among other things, one had to "emphasize his (or her) empathy".

Let's apply that approach by putting ourselves in the position of the "Bad Guy". We'll call him Mr. Bad.

Now, lets inventory the ingredients that have been assembled.

We have computerized control of the phone system.

We have built in special features such as three way calling.

We have a need for occasional maintenance of the phone system.

We have a potentially profitable target.

And, last but not least, we have the unscrupulous and resourceful, Mr. Bad. 

Mr. Bad can now attack the phone system and start collecting that valuable information.

First, he must identify the lawyer or lawyers who have the type of practice that would put he or she on the inside of major business deals. There are a million ways to do that... newspapers, magazines, law directories, the internet, pretext inquiries of other lawyers, local lawyers watering holes,  etc. For the sake of this discussion, we'll call the lawyer whose phone we are going to tap, Mr. Target.

Next, Mr. Bad should try to identify Mr. Target's assigned phone number. It might appear in a local Bar Association directory. If not, there are other ways to skin this cat.   These range from a bit of  "social engineering" of the receptionist, to dialing another member of the firm at random and acting as if the caller is a good friend of Mr. Target. who was somehow connected to the wrong number. If the first call of that kind does not surface Mr. Target's assigned phone number, the second or third one will. If that doesn't work there are many other places that Mr. Target has used his assigned office phone because he wants to keep his home phone number private.   In the final analysis, Mr. Bad does not have to worry or expend much effort on this phase, because failure to get this number will not hold up the operation. This is  merely a potentially useful intermediate step in identifying Mr. Target's "station number". He needs the "station number" so that he can, using the computerized switch, take control of Mr. Target's phone.   He can always find that station number once he busts into the computerized switch... and that is his next move.  

We have mentioned the fact that these computerized switches need maintenance. But, we have not mentioned that in most cases, laziness and greed on the part of those who provide the the maintenance service lays the entire system open to hostile penetration and control! 

And now, Mr. Bad is in the home stretch. He has only to dial up the modem and take control of the computerized switch! Once in control of the switch, he can tell it to perform many tasks. He may decide to avail himself of one of the system's amenities. For example, he may issue instructions to the switch to use the built in "Three Way Calling" feature. In that manner, each time Mr. Target picked up his phone, Mr. Bad would be a third party, silently listening and recording the conversation!  We have intentionally omitted three intermediate tasks that Mr. Bad must perform. Before he can take control of the switch he must get the phone number of the modem, and if it is password protected, the password. In addition,  he can expect the switch itself to be password protected, so he will need that password as well. Because this is intended as an expose and not a blueprint for wiretapping, we are not going to to lay out how those tasks can be accomplished -- suffice to say, that part takes knowledge and skill, but  is not a major undertaking. 

How can one defend against this penetration scenario?

One cost-free and effective solution would be to remove the maintenance modem from the system. It is there only as a convenience to the people who maintain the system. Obviously, they will not be happy with such a suggestion because it would mean that someone would have to respond to the facility, in person, to perform the required maintenance. That costs money. If money is the only issue, paying a little extra for in person maintenance, sounds like a pretty worthwhile  expenditure.

If I were to get rid of the modem, would that protect me from eavesdropping?

There is no "magic bullet" that will protect you from all eavesdrops. You can only make yourself a more difficult target.  This is a common sense step in that direction.

We started this section with the caption "A Dirty Little Secret" and we did indeed reveal a seldom acknowledged fact -- large computerized switches in offices were vulnerable to hostile control! Now, for the rest of the story!!

Large computerized switches at telephone companies employ the same general type of technology and are vulnerable to the same type of attack! Obviously, this is the last thing that the telephone companies want to admit. The liability is devastating. So, if you made inquiry of the phone companies they would deny that it is possible. It would be nice if we could believe them, I can't.

What has all this got to do with the vulnerability of telephone company switches to outside control? Just this - the Out-Call Services have been victims -- and we believe perpetrators, of illegal penetrations and control of telephone company central office switches!

So there you have the rest of the story... the second half of the Dirty Little Secret...  Some say that Telephone company central office switches have been hacked into and controlled by unauthorized persons!! On the other side we have the telephone companies saying that their security measures are so effective that such a penetration is not possible. Who do you believe?

Today is July 2, 1999. It has been about 2 months since the "Dirty Little Secret"  first appeared on our web site. This morning's Las Vegas Review Journal, page 1B, contains additional evidence in support of  our contention that phone systems are being hacked into. The following are pertinent excerpts from that Review Journal article. It makes me wonder how long the phone companies will be able to live in denial.